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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I .

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract and judicial foreclosure case.

The Appellant ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation (herein "ALBAR")
is a Defendant on the claims in Bonner County Case CV-2007-1489
for breach of contract and is the Plaintiff on the claims in
Bonner County Case CV-2007-1841 for judicial foreclosure of a note
and deed of trust.

The Appellant ALBAR appeals against the

Respondents ECHO VANDERWAL and JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio
corporation registered in Idaho (herein "JLZ") , and JAMES O.
STEAMBARGE, a single man, from the Judgment And Decree Of Sale,
entered in the above entitled action on July 27, 2010, and from
the Order Disallowing Attorney's Fees And Costs entered in the
above entitled action on November 5, 2010, and from the
Memorandum Decision and Order re: Albar's Motion For Relief From
Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on September 30,
2011, the Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, presiding.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On or about August 31, 2007, ECHO VANDERWAL and JLZ

ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio corporation registered in Idaho
(herein "JLZ") as the buyer of real property commenced an action
against ALBAR as the seller of the real property and others
involved in the real estate transaction.

The action included

several claims based upon the real estate transaction and
subsequent cleanup efforts for the Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality regulated petroleum leak site, on the
property, which is known gas the Dock-N-Shop in Priest River,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1

Idaho.

R. Pgs. 12-25.

On or about November 2, 2007, ALBAR commenced an action
against JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. and JAMES O. STEAMBARGE for
judicial foreclosure and for priority adjudication of its
Seller's note and deed of trust, secured by the Dock-N-Shop
property. R. Pgs. 246-251.
On or about November 26, 2008, the actions were
consolidated.

R. Pgs. 57-59.

The claims by JLZ against MARITA STEWART dba LAKE COUNTRY
REAL ESTATE were dismissed prior to trial.

R. Pgs. 87-90.

JLZ

and ALBAR entered certain stipulations involving the respective
claims and admitting certain matters, which resulted in a
resolution of all claims except for JLZ's causes of action for
breach of contract and mutual mistake, and for offset damages, if
any, against the sums due by JLZ to ALBAR on the judicial
foreclosure.

R. Pgs. 103-122.

Commencing on or about June 22, 2009 and proceeding through
June 25, 2009, the matter came for trial.
made on June 30, 2009.

Closing arguments were

The Court announced its decision on the

record in open sessions on July 2, 2009 and September 3, 2009.
A motion for reconsideration by JLZ was heard on January 6,
2010 and the Court entered its Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion For
Reconsideration And For Clarification on or about May 11, 2010.
R. Pgs. 167-180.

Alternative forms of judgment were presented

for entry and briefing upon interest was ordered.

R. Pgs. 181-

195.
On July 27, 2010, the Court entered its Order on Proposed
Judgments and its Judgment and Decree Of Sale.
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R. Pgs. 200-207.

ALBAR sought an award of attorney fees and costs.
208-229.

R. Pgs.

The request was denied.

ALBAR timely filed its Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice
of Appeal, respectively.

R. Pgs. 230-239.

While the appeal was pending, on or about November 30, 2010,
ALBAR filed its Motion For Relief From Judgment.
Filed November 30, 2010.

Supp. R. Motion

The matter came for hearing on June 8,

2011 followed by briefing. Supp. R. Briefs and Memoranda Filed
July 22, 2011 and August 3, 2011.

On or about September 30,

2011, the Court entered it's Memorandum Decision And Order re:
Albar's Motion For Relief From Judgment denying the relief
sought.

Supp. R. Memorandum Decision Filed September 30, 2011.

ALBAR timely filed its Second Amended Notice Of Appeal.

III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
ALBAR owned and operated a commercial convenience store, fuel
sales, and marina business known as the Dock-N-Shop upon 2 parcels
of real property located in Priest River, Idaho, upon the Pend
Oreille River.

On Memorial Day Weekend in May 2003, a petroleum

fuel tank leak or release occurred from an underground storage
tank ("UST") on the real property.

ALBAR'S three (3) petroleum

underground storage tanks and fuel system met all applicable
regulatory provisions and ALBAR was insured through the State of
Idaho Petroleum Storage Tank Fund ("PSTF") at the time of the fuel
release in 2003.
Immediately following the fuel release, personnel from ALBAR,
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("IDEQ"), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Idaho Petroleum
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3

Storage Tank Fund ("PSTF"), Kleinfelder, an environmental
engineering firm, and certain subcontractor equipment operators
met on scene and began immediate containment efforts, including
the construction of wall and barrier to prevent the release of
petroleum from traveling into the waters of the United States,
specifically the Pend Oreille River.
Immediately following and as part of the containment efforts,
soils were removed and disposed at an approved facility. Over the
next several months monitoring and remediation systems were
installed to address soil contamination and groundwater
contamination and a Consent Order was entered into in the late
summer 2003 between ALBAR through its insurer the Idaho Petroleum
Storage Tank Fund, and the Fund's contractor Kleinfelder, and the
IDEQ (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).

The remediation project covered the

Dock-N-Shop property, as well as immediately adjacent real
property.
Prior to and at the time of the release, the Dock-n-Shop
business and real property were zoned commercial, with a
commercial venture being operated on the property.

Commercial

Soil and Groundwater remediation clean up levels were established
by the IDEQ and Kleinfelder with specific Site Specific Target
Levels (SSTLs) based upon Idaho RBCA Guidelines.

The remediation

project continued.
In 2005, JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC.

("JLZ"), operated by ECHO

VANDERWAL purchased three contiguous parcels adjoining the Dock-NShop parcel to the west, which included a portion of a parcel that
had been impacted by the fuel leak.

(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 6) .

After closing on the three parcels to the East of the Dock-nAPPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4

Shop, on June 14, 2005, ECHO T. VANDERWAL/JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC.
AND/OR ASSIGNS submitted an offer to ALBAR for the purchase of the
Dock-n-Shop business and property by an RE-23 Commercial/
Investment Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement with RE-17
Financing Addendum #1 and RE-11 Addendum/Amendment #2 attached
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

The offer was signed Echo VanderWal,

with the signature physically placed upon the documents by Marita
Stewart.

At the time of the offer Echo VanderWal was residing in

and physically located in Ohio.
On June 16, 2005, by RE-13 Counter Offer #1 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2), ALBAR countered, which was accepted on June 16,2005
signed Echo VanderWal with the signature physically placed upon
the document by Marita Stewart.

At the time of the counter-offer

and the acceptance Echo VanderWal was still in Ohio.
At the time of the offer, counter-offer, and acceptance, the
property was listed with Marita Stewart, Broker of Lake Country
Real Estate and agent Owen Mullen.

At the time, Marita Stewart

and Owen Mullen had also been the agent for JLZ in the purchase of
the 3 parcels to the East of the Dock-n-Shop, and represented JLZ
in the offer and counter-offer with ALBAR.
JLZ's offer to ALBAR to purchase the Dock-N-Shop and the
executed purchase and sale agreement provided for inspections of
the property by JLZ, and an "as-is" condition clause at closing.
The purchase and sale agreement included a clause in the counteroffer #1 as item 3. that "Seller has all responsibility and
liability for recent gasoline spill on property and adjoining
property."

ALBAR rejected a term in the proposed Addendum #1 by

JLZ that provided that "2. Offer is contingent upon EPA giving
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cl.osure to gasoline spill on site."
After the Purchase And Sale Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2)
was entered into, Echo VanderWal went to the real property only
once prior to closing for a meeting.

Present were Echo VanderWal,

her children and family members, Marita Stewart, Owen Mullen, and
Al. Sudau on behalf of ALBAR.
JLZ in the offer by paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 and paragraph 3
of the Addendum #2 and paragraph of 4 of the Counter Offer #1,
accepted the condition of the property, subject to a 45 day
inspection period, and chose to have inspections.

The offer by

JLZ indicated a contingency for a conditional use permit for
condominiums on the "ajoining [sic - adjoining] property."

The

counter-offer, item 2, indicates likewise a conditional use permit
for the "adjoining property."
JLZ, prior to closing with ALBAR, on August 4 or 5, 2005,
submitted a Conditional Use Permit to the City of Priest River for
a "Mixed Use Development Of Residential And Retail" (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 7") .
Item 3 of the counter offer provides "Sel.ler has al.l
responsibility and liability for recent gasoline spill on property
and adjoining property."
Prior to closing, VanderWal/JLZ proposed seller financing of
a portion of the $539,000 purchase price with $250,000 carried on
a note and deed of trust (which provided for non-removal. of the
building) by the Seller ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit I).
Prior to closing, Echo VanderWal./JLZ made no indication to
ALBAR of not continuing the operations of the Dock-n-Shop as an
ongoing commercial concern, consisting of a convenience store,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6

fuel sales, and marina.

RE-11 Addendum #3 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2)

dated August 29, 2005 signed by both ALBAR and JLZ, similarly
provides for continued commercial operation by ALBAR including aid
in the transfer of all licenses for operations to JLZ prior to and
after closing.
Closing between ALBAR and JLZ occurred on or about September
15, 2005. The existing PSTF insurance policy for the remaining two
(2) USTs was transferred from ALBAR to JLZ (Defendant's Exhibit J

& Defendant's Exhibit K).
At closing ALBAR took back the note secured by a deed of
trust upon the property.

ALBAR was the holder of a Deed of Trust

Note (herein "Note"), dated September 6, 2005 in the original
principal sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS
($250,000.00).

The maturity date of the note was modified by an

extension dated August 24, 2006 (Defendant's Exhibits A and B).
ALBAR was the beneficiary of a Deed of Trust Including Due-On-Sale
Rider (Defendant's Exhibit C) securing said Note, recorded
September 16, 2005 as Instrument No. 687257, records of Bonner
County, Idaho, concerning real property within Bonner County,
Idaho, described as follows:
PARCEL I:
The Easterly most 197.5 feet of the following described
tract:
Commencing at a point on the South line of the right of
way of the Great Northern Railroad Company, 375 feet
West of the East line of Lot 6, Section 25, Township 56
North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian;
thence South on a line at right angles with the said
right of way to the North Bank of the Pend Oreille
River;
thence West along the said North Bank to a point where
the same in intersected by the line of a parcel of land
sold to the Village of Priest River, by Deed, dated
April 28, 1956, and now used as a right of way and
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approach for the bridge across the said river;
thence North along the East line to the South line of
the right of way of the Great Northern Railroad
Company;
thence East along said right of way to the true point
of beginning.
Excepting therefrom the following described tract:
Beginning at a point on the South line of the
Burlington Northern Railroad Company right of way,
375.0 feet West of the East line of Government Lot 6,
Section 25, Township 56 North, Range 5 West, Boise
Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho;
thence South 1°20'48" East along an existing fence to
the North Bank of the Pend Oreille River;
thence Northwesterly along the North Bank of the Pend
Oreille River a distance of approximately 202 feet to a
point which is South from a point on the South right of
way line of the Burlington Northern Railroad Company a
distance of 197.5 feet West of the Point of Beginning;
thence North 4.0 feet;
thence Southeasterly parallel with the North Bank of
the Pend Oreille River to a point which is South from a
point on the South of the right of way line of the
Burlington Northern Railroad Company a distance of
100.0 feet from the Point of Beginning;
thence North to said Point;
thence East along said right of way line a distance of
100.0 feet to the Point of Beginning.
PARCEL II:
That portion of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fee
Railway Company's (formerly Great Northern Railway
Company) 300.00 Station Ground property at Priest
River, Idaho, being 200.00 feet wide on the Northerly
side and 100.0 feet wide on the Southerly side of said
Railway Company's Main Track centerline, as now located
and constructed upon, over and across Government Lot 6
of Section 25, Township 56 North, Range 5 West, B.M.,
Bonner County, Idaho, described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at the intersection with the Easterly line of
that certain easement from Great Northern Railway
Company to Bonner County, Idaho, for roadway purposes
of the Southerly extension of Wisconsin Street dated
April 15, 1958 with the Southerly line of said State
Ground property; thence Easterly along said Southerly
line 371.0 feet; thence Northerly at right angles to
said Southerly line 50.0 feet; thence Westerly parallel
with said Main Track centerline 10.0 feet; thence
Northerly at right angles to said Main Track centerline
30.0 feet; thence Westerly parallel with and 20.0 feet
Southerly, as measured at right angles from said Main
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

Track centerline 360 feet more or less, to the Easterly
line of said easement for the Southerly extension of
Wisconsin Street; thence Southerly along said Easterly
line to the True Point of Beginning.
JLZ is the maker of said Note in favor of ALBAR and the grantor of
the Deed of Trust in favor of ALBAR.
After purchasing the ALBAR property, JLZ also purchased
additional parcels adjoining the Dock-N-Shop to the east.
Immediately after closing with ALBAR, Echo VanderWal/JLZ
closed the store, gave away the inventory and contents of the
business and ceased operations of the Dock-n-Shop, which was the
first time ALBAR had any notice of such intention.
Prior to closing Echo VanderWal did not contact the IDEQ,
PSTF, or Kleinfelder regarding the remediation of the Dock-n-Shop
property.

Following the closing of the transaction and the

closing of the Dock-n-Shop business by JLZ, Echo VanderWal
returned to Ohio (with a two week trip to Africa in the last two
weeks of October 2005) until a Christmas time trip to Idaho in
December 2005 and/or January 2006 consisting of one to two weeks,
and then she returned to Ohio.
In January 2006, JLZ had a development team meeting regarding
the Priest River real property, including the three parcels to the
East, the Dock-n-Shop property, and the adjoining parcels to the
West that had been acquired or were under contract for purchase.
Since the closing on the Dock-n-Shop, Echo VanderWal still had not
contacted the IDEQ, PSTF, or Kleinfelder regarding the ongoing
fuel release remediation of the Dock-n-Shop property.
At some point after the January 2006 development team
meeting, Echo VanderWal requested Steve Klatt to make contacts
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

regarding the remediation, extending the note, and removal of the
building from the Dock-n-Shop site.
the time.

Echo VanderWal was in Ohio at

Steve Klatt on behalf of JLZ began conversing and

corresponding with Al Sudau on behalf of ALBAR.

By April 2006,

Steve Klatt had prepared a table of issues and the respective
parties' concerns as developed from the discussions (Defendant's
Exhibit AA), which were the soil remediation, extending the note,
and removal of the building.
The discussions and contacts between Steve Klatt and Al Sudau
were cordial and a good relationship existed.
Defendant's Exhibit BB).

(See also

Steve Klatt was also in contact with

DEQ, PSTF, and Kleinfelder during the late spring and early summer
2006 and prepared a Memorandum dated June 25, 2006 (Defendant's
Exhibit L) and he prepared correspondence with Echo VanderWal
(Defendant's Exhibit N).
Steve Klatt in discussions with IDEQ, PSTF, and Kleinfelder
was proposing on behalf of JLZ the removal of the building and was
indicating the potential for future residential use of the
property.

In the end of July, 2006, a potential meeting was

discussed and scheduled to review the proposed course by JLZ.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 0 and Defendants Exhibits 0, CC, DD, EE, FF,
GG).

Al Sudau was concerned with the removal of the building and

had ongoing discussions with Steve Klatt regarding the requested
removal compared to the note and deed of trust provisions for
maintaining the property and the structures, which were security
for the debt.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 and Defendant's Exhibits

HH) •

A meeting was held at IDEQ in Coeur d'Alene on August 16,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10

2006 regarding JLZ's proposed course for the remediation.

In late

August 2006, Echo VanderWal/JLZ requested an extension of the note
and ALBAR agreed (Defendant's Exhibit B).

At the end of August

2006, Echo VanderWal came to Idaho from Ohio and removed the
building upon the Dock-n-Shop property over the objections from
ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit II).
On August 29, 2009 ALBAR re-structured the dissemination of
information and the contacts regarding remediation, so that ALBAR
was included (Defendants Exhibit's JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, 00, PP,
QQ) .
In late September or early October, 2006, Echo VanderWal went
to Africa and upon her return moved from Ohio to Idaho.

Echo

VanderWal was in Idaho from November 2006 until March/April or
April/May 2007 when she was in Africa for 2 months, and then in
Idaho until December 2007, at which point she was on the East
Coast or in Africa except for during December 2008 and January
2009 when she was in Idaho and except for during the trial in this
matter.
Through the fall of 2006 the PSTF funded remediation process
on behalf of ALBAR continued, with the submittal of a Confirmation
Sampling Work Plan as the site was close to closure under the
existing Corrective Action Plan (Defendant's Exhibit VV) as well
as additional boring and sampling under the location of the former
building during low water.
In early December 2006 contract was made regarding JLZ
enrolling the property in the IDEQ Voluntary Remediation Program
(Defendant's Exhibit P).

In December 2006, Echo VanderWal, in an

emotional state, telephoned Al Sudau concerned over what
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11

information Owen Mullen had in regards to the remediation of the
Dock-n-Shop property.

Al Sudau reviewed that Mullen had been

directed to gather all the information from IDEQ, PSTF, and
Kleinfelder that was wanted by JLZ.

Echo VanderWal called a

second time that same date, expressing concern that she was
financially going under and couldn't build her new house or buy
Christmas gifts for her children.
In January 2007 Echo VanderWal on behalf of JLZ instructed
her attorney to send a demand letter regarding the sharing of and
access to information (Plaintiff's Exhibit 15).

ALBAR thereafter

instituted a written contact policy for all remediation and
contact, and Steve Klatt, Kleinfelder, and IDEQ were uncertain as
to the basis for the demand letter by JLZ or the assertions of
withholding information (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 and Defendant's
Exhibits YY, and ZZ).

ALBAR attempted to make sure the public

information was available through contact with IDEQ and contact
with ALBAR.

Steve Klatt acknowledged progress (Defendant's

Exhibits ZZ, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF) .
In late January 2007, the analytical results from the
samplings under the former building were back, which identified
four isolated soil contaminations, which information was conveyed
to Steve Klatt (Defendant's Exhibits NNN).

Kleinfelder also

continued discussion with Steve Klatt regarding JLZ removing the
other two USTs as part of a residential remediation level and the
delay by Echo VanderWal in responding (Defendant's Exhibits 000
and PPP) .
In February 2007 and beyond, efforts continued to get a
response from Echo VanderWal/JLZ for the removal of the two UST's
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as part of a dig and haul process for under the former building,
as well as attempts to get a response for moving forward with a
dig and haul and injection plan modification to the existing
remediation (Defendant's Exhibits Q, QQQ, RRR, SSS, TTT, UUU, VVV,
WWW, XXX, YYY, ZZZ, AAAA, BBBB, CCCC, DDDD, EEEE, FFFF, GGGG,
HHHH, IIII, JJJJ, KKKK, LLLL, MMMM, NNNN, 0000, and PPPP)
In February 16, 2007, while the Kleinfelder efforts were
underway, JLZ engaged its own environmental engineer Golder &
Associates, who reported that per the IDEQ, Soil remediation was
nearly complete, with additional limited soil removal needed to
meet a residential scenario and that in regards to Groundwater
remediation that Kleinfelder felt the standards had been met, but
that IDEQ would likely require a Deed Restriction, which would not
impact residential use because of the municipal water supply
available to serve the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and
Defendant's Exhibits Exhibit R).
Echo VanderWal continued here secretive approach, engaging an
environmental engineer and delaying responses and information to
ALBAR and for the remediation (Defendant's Exhibits S, T, U, V, W,
and X) .
In the spring of 2007, a prospective buyer was in contact
with Steve Klatt (Defendant's Exhibits Y).

In the end of June and

into July 2007, a modification to the remediation was not moving
forward to the satisfaction of JLZ and Echo VanderWal/JLZ moved
forward Golder's involvement, including site visits with Golder
and Kleinfelder personal, as well as Steve Klatt.
Bye-mail dated July 5, 2007, ALBAR again offered to allow
JLZ to prepare a plan and funding for remediation and that ALBAR
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

would pay that sum for an indemnification for clean up
(Defendant's Exhibits BBBBB).

Also by July 2007, commercial clean

up levels were consistently met (Defendants Exhibit CCCCC and
HHHHH) .

JLZ failed to make the payment due July 16, 2007 to ALBAR on
the promissory note.

JLZ failed to make any of the monthly

payments due after July 16, 2007, and failed to pay upon the
maturity date of the note on September 16, 2007.
By the beginning of August 2007, JLZ proceeded with removal
of the two USTs without notice to ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG
and JJJJJ).

Even in late August 2007, the IDEQ was considering

seeking residential level cleanups, solely based upon the actions
of JLZ (Defendant's Exhibits NNNNN and QQQQQ).
Into the fall of 2007 Groundwater thresholds for commercial
sites were met again, making four in a row (Defendant's Exhibits
RRRRR and SSSSS) with only the four isolated Soil locations under
the former building being present (Defendant's Exhibit TTTTT).
In the fall of 2007, JLZ sought enrollment of the Dock-n-Shop
property into the IDEQ Voluntary Rmnediation Program and Pilot
Project Funds (Defendant's Exhibit WWWWW attached Exhibit B,
Exhibit XXXXX and Defendant's Exhibit FFFFFF).

The enrollment

created liability for JLZ for remediation where none previously
existed and provided for reimbursement of up to 70% of costs or
$150,000.00, whichever was greater.
ALBAR through its PSTF insurance asserted to IDEQ that the
actions of JLZ in submitting its own remediation plan in the face
of the existing plan was problematic (Defendant's Exhibits WWWWW,
UUUUU, VVVVV) and submitted comments in regards to the JLZ plan,
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not objecting to the clean up efforts proposed, but rather
identifying issues for resolution as part of the process
(Defendant's Exhibits YYYYY,

zzzzz, AAAAAA).

The IDEQ entered into an agreement with JLZ for the Voluntary
Remediation plan and Pilot Project Funding and terminated the IDEQ
consent order with ALBAR, effective April 10, 2008 (Defendant's
Exhibits BBBBBB, CCCCCC, and DDDDDD as to the portions admitted).
JLZ proceeded with its own clean up efforts, and had entered
the monitoring phase by the time of trial in June 2009.

At trial,

JLZ had failed to perform the most recent required monitoring of
the remediation work, and had not received an approved clean up
status for the site, nor any Certificate of Completion or Covenant
Not To Sue regarding the Dock-n-Shop site from the IDEQ.
From the conclusion of the trial in June 2009, time elapsed
until the Court to announce its decision, followed by proceedings
on motions to reconsider and motions for attorney fees.

On July

27, 2010, the Judgment And Decree of Sale was entered by the
Court, followed by the Appellant ALBAR filing this appeal.
Unbeknownst to ALBAR, following trial, IDEQ paid for the
necessary quarterly monitoring for the JLZ remediation work
(Supplemental Exhibit "F").

The necessary monitoring was

completed and in June, 2010, JLZ obtained a Certificate of
Completion and a Covenant Not To Sue from the IDEQ for the Dock-NShop property.

(Supplemental Exhibits "A" and "B") .

Coincidentally with the entry of the judgment, on July 27,
~010,

JLZ applied for reimbursement from the Idaho Department of

Environmental Quality ("IDEQ") for clean up and remediation costs.
(Supplemental Exhibit "C").
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The reimbursement sought included

significant sums as awarded by the Court as offset damages in the
action against ALBAR.
On September 7, 2010, the IDEQ required additional
information from JLZ for reimbursement.
"D").

(Supplemental Exhibit

On or about March 1, 2011, JLZ submitted is revised

application for reimbursement through the IDEQ pilot program of
its clean up costs.

(Supplemental Exhibit "E") .

On or about March 21, 2011, DEQ approved reimbursement to JLZ
for clean up costs in the net reimbursable sum of $145,021.95
(Supplemental Exhibits "F" and "G").

The total qualifying

remediation costs were $217,950.31, with the program being capped
at $150,000.00 for reimbursement.

The IDEQ also deducted from the

available $150,000.00, the sum of $4,978.00 that the DEQ had
directly disbursed to obtain the last monitoring and reports
necessary for the site clearance.

The net amount approved and

received on March 29, 2011 by JLZ from the IDEQ reimbursement
program was $145,021.95.
Albar sought relief from the judgment for the sums received
by JLZ.

On September 30, 2011, the District Court entered its

Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Albar's Motion For Relief From
Judgment, denying any relief for the offset damages awarded
against ALBAR for the sums received by JLZ from the IDEQ for
remediation costs.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Appellant ALBAR'S statement of the issues on appeal is
as follows:
(a)

Did the District Court err in concluding that

ALBAR, INC. breached its contract with JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC.
for remediation?
(b)

Did the District Court err in deter.mining and

awarding damages to JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. for breach of
contract?
(c)

Did the District Court err in not awarding

attorney fees and costs to ALBAR, INC.?
(d)

Did the District Court err in not granting relief

to Albar for funds received by JLZ from the DEQ for
remediation?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Appellant ALBAR seeks an award attorney fees on appeal
against the Respondent JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., pursuant to the
Note and the Deed of Trust, the Real Estate Purchase And Sale
Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code § 6-402,
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

ALBAR, INC. DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH JLZ ENTERPRISES,
INC. FOR REMEDIATION
The central issues in this case is the interpretation of the

accepted Purchase And Sale Agreement provision in Counter-offer
#1, paragraph 3, which provides "Seller has all responsibility and
liability for recent gasoline spill on property and adjoining
property."

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

The Respondent JLZ asserted

a breach of contract by Appellant ALBAR in not

t~ely

completing

remediation of the contamination from the fuel leak in 2003.
asserted damages resulted from such a breach.

JLZ

ALBAR disputed any

breach of contract and/or the damages requested.
In Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148
Idaho 630, 633,

(2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17, 2010) the Idaho

Supreme Court held in regards to the interpretation of a
contract, as follows:
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with
the document's language. Cristo Viene Pentecostal
Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747
(2007). "In the absence of ambiguity, the document must
be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense,
according to the meaning derived from the plain wording
of the instrument." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763,
765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). Interpreting an unambiguous
contract and determining whether there has been a
violation of that contract is an issue of law subject
to free review. Qpportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136
Idaho 602, 605-06, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261-62 (2002). A
contract term is ambiguous when there are two different
reasonable interpretations or the language is
nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59,
62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an
ambiguous term is an issue of fact. Bakker v. Thunder
Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d
332, 337 (2005) (quotation omitted) .
The District Court, in announcing its decision, made several
conclusions of law regarding the agreement between ALBAR and JLZ,
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which are set forth in the Court Trial and Judge's Decision
Transcript, pages 1078 through 1088.

The District Court relied

upon several factors in making that determination.

The relevant

positions of the parties as to the interpretation of the
contractual term must be measured against the provisions of the
contract and the conduct at the time of the relevant facts and
circumstances.
In J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614 (2006), the
Idaho Supreme Court explained as follows:
If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the
interpretation of those provisions is a question of fact
which focuses upon the intent of the parties. Bream v.
Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The
determination of the parties' intent is to be determined by
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the
document, the circumstances under which i t was made, the
objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as
shown by their conduct or dealings. Ramco v. H-K
Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990);
Internationa~ Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Daum Indus., Inc., 102
Idaho 363, 630 P.2d 155 (1981). A party's subjective,
undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a
contract. As explained in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 347
(2004) :
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial
to the interpretation of a contract, as under the
objective law of contract interpretation, the court
will give force and effect to the words of the contract
without regard to what the parties to the contract
thought i t meant or what they actually intended for it
to mean. The court will not attempt to ascertain the
actual mental processes of the parties in entering into
the particular contract; rather the law presumes that
the parties understood the import of their contract and
that they had the intention which its terms manifest.
A.

The Purchase And Sale Agreement Did Not Require
Remediation Be Completed To JLZ's Satisfaction.

The Purchase And Sale Agreement ("PSA") does not provide for
ALBAR to remediate or obtain DEQ approval of a clean up of the
site to the satisfaction of JLZ.
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At closing and following

closing, ALBAR remained the party in agreement with the IDEQ under
the Consent Order.

Paragraph 3 of Counter-Offer #1 only provides

for ALBAR to have responsibility and liability for the petroleum
leak. JLZ's plans for the property are not the subject of the
agreement, and at the time of the sale, the business on the
property was an ongoing concern, which is contrary to JLZ's
assertion breach because the property was not "cleared for
development."

The PSA did not require a parcel cleared for

development, and to the contrary, JLZ bought the property and
business as is, subject to an existing Consent Order and an
existing ongoing remediation.
In Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468 (Idaho App. 2006), the
Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted a purchase and sale agreement
with addenda provision that the Seller clear title.

The Court of

Appeals explained in regard to a party having an obligation beyond
the control of the party, such as to obtain marketable title, that
the condition precedent gives rise to an implied duty of good
faith to attempt to perform the condition.

The PSA between JLZ

and ALBAR did not require ALBAR to obtain a specific remediation.
ALBAR met its good faith duty compared to the sale of the property
and ongoing business.

JLZ did not bargain for, and ALBAR is not

liable, for any set period of remediation (whether within a
reasonable time or not), nor any specific remediation result.

B.

The Conduct of JLZ Does Not Create Liability for ALBAR

Albar asserts that the relevant documents and conduct for the
Court to use to interpret the contract, all occurred prior to or
at closing on September 15, 2005.
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Those are:

1.

Albar had a long operating commercial convenience

store, fuel sales, and marina business, known as the Dock-n-Shop.
2.

In 2003 a fuel release occurred and a remediation

system was in place that had prevented fuel from reaching the
Priest River and that allowed the continued operations of the
Dock-n-Shop.

A Consent Order was in place and a commercial

remediation plan was established for the property and approved, or
at least allowed to proceed, by the Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality (IDEQ).
3.

Investigation and remediation under the Dock-N-Shop

building would have required structural damage and changes to the
building and ongoing commercial operations.

Such a course was not

required by IDEQ, regardless of JLZ asserted interpretation of the
non-specific 2004 IDEQ correspondence.
4.

JLZ's June 14, 2005 offer for the property and Albar's

June 16, 2005 counter-offer, which resulted in an accepted
Purchase And Sale Agreement ("PSA") on June 16, 2005, is the
contract at issue here.
5.

All of the language of the PSA provides for CUP

residential or hotel/rental development of the adjoining property,
not the Dock-n-Shop property.
6.

The PSA also provided for JLZ to accept the property in

it's as is condition, and that JLZ chose to have inspections and
investigations of that condition.
7.

Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 in the PSA is the

sole provision upon which JLZ asserts its breach of contract.

It

provides: "Seller has all responsibility and liability for recent
gasoline spill on property and adjoining property."
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The spill

occurred in May 2003, with the PSA being entered into in June
2005, which would define the term "recent" as over two years.
8.

The as-is provision and the JLZ inspection and

investigation provisions, are not obviated by the provision in
paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer.

Those terms can and should be

interpreted for a consistent result, given the facts and
circumstances at that
9.

t~e.

The rejected Addendum #2 which JLZ proposed provided

for closure of the gasoline spill remediation on the site.
10.

Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 in the PSA does not

provide for any express requirement for a specific final
remediation, let alone a time frame for remediation.

The

remediation plan in existence at the time of closing between ALBAR
and JLZ was for a commercial operation.
11.

Prior to closing, JLZ continued its later shown

apparent charade of an intention of operating the business, and
Addendum #3 dated August 29, 2005 provides for Albar to aid in the
transfer of the licenses to operate prior to and after closing.
12.

Also, prior to closing, JLZ apparently had enough

information to determine that institutional lending would not be
available because of environmental concerns and JLZ proposed that
Albar carry part of the purchase price, with a pledge of the
property, including the building and other improvements.
13.

It is readily apparent that Albar directed all

inquiries as to the status of the fuel spill and remediation to
the regulatory authorities IDEQ, the insurer PSTF, and the
contractor handing the remediation Kleinfelder, and authorized
release of all information.
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14.

It is also readily apparent that JLZ performed some

sort of investigation and inspection as to the fuel spill and
remediation, as Echo VanderWal testified institutional lending was
not available.

JLZ had also previously purchased the adjoining 3

parcels, which included impacts from the fuel release.
15.

At closing, the intention of the parties as set forth

in the documents making up the PSA must be the yard stick to
measure the contractual obligations by the provision in paragraph
3 in the Counter Offer.
16.

Albar sold a going commercial concern, with a

remediation in place that allowed the ongoing operations, and took
back a security interest in the property and buildings.
17.

JLZ had investigated the fuel spill and existing

remediation, and closed on its purchase.

Also, it submitted a CUP

application to the City of Priest River for a mixed use
residential and retail on adjoining property.
JLZ asserts as part of its urged interpretation for its
asserted breach of contract, that certain statements were made by
both A1 Sudau and Owen Mullen during Echo VanderWal's only visit
to the property prior to closing, which was after the PSA was
entered into.

Echo VanderWal asserts that at the meeting that A1

Sudau on behalf of ALBAR and that Owen Mullen each separately
stated to her that "the soils were remediated and clear and that
only two monitoring session were need."

Al Sudau asserts on

behalf of ALBAR that at the meeting at the property with Echo
VanderWal, no such statement was made by him, and that he did not
hear Owen Mullen make such a statement.

No other corroborating

witness was offered by Echo VanderWal as to the asserted
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statements by Al Sudau on behalf of ALBAR or the asserted
statements by Owen Mullen.
The credibility of Echo VanderWal and her ability to recall
and her ability to separate her emotions from her recollection,
cast great doubt upon these assertions.

Also, at the time of

purchasing the three parcels to the East, and then entering into
the Purchase And Sale Agreement with ALBAR, Echo VanderWal
testified she had a long relationship with Marita Stewart and
trusted Marita Stewart and Owen Mullen, both of Lake Country Real
Estate, which was JLZ's long time broker.
If any such statements were made, the evidence supports a
finding and conclusion that Al Sudau and ALBAR were not aware of
such matters.

The back and forth between the offer and counter-

offer, show that Albar was not willing to condition the purchase
and sale upon the provision in Addendum #1 that "2. Offer is
contingent upon EPA giving closure to gasoline spill on site."

If

such statements were made and/or if JLZ understood or believed
statements of those type to be accurate, JLZ did nothing to
include such obligations or contingencies in the accepted PSA, and
further undertook its own 45 inspection period.
Any purported statement or representation asserted by or on
behalf of JLZ may not be attributed to the Seller ALBAR and may
not be used to interpret provision 3 of Counter Offer #1 by the
operation of Idaho Code § 54-2093(1) as such would have been a
wrongful act, error, omission, or misrepresentation, of which
ALBAR and Al Sudau had no actual knowledge of, nor should have
reasonably known of.
Similarly, any purported assertion of interpretation based
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upon the listing materials or the Seller's Property Disclosure
Form, is not available, given the merger/integration clause of the
PSA.

Additionally, Ms. VanderWal's testimony as to when and if

she reviewed the document, failed to establish any relevant time
frame.
From the time of contracting by the PSA and to closing, JLZ
was on notice of the existing fuel release, the existing
remediation plan which was IDEQ approved and regulated and PSTF
financed.

JLZ was on notice of all reasonable information that a

reasonable investigation at the time of purchase would have
revealed.

JLZ only contracted for ALBAR to remain responsible and

liable for the ramifications of the fuel release.
In Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 153 (1998) the Idaho
Supreme Court reiterated that:
This Court has stated that when one is purchasing land, the
rule of caveat emptor applies and that "whatever is notice
enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all
such facts as a reasonable investigation would disclose."
Hi~~ v. Federa~ Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 789,
791 (1938). See a~so, Farre~~ v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027,
1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ct.App.1986).
By the agreement, JLZ choose to have inspections and JLZ's
consultants were involved prior to closing on September 16, 2005.
In Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741, 743 (Idaho
2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that: "One who purchases
property is put on notice of title disputes that a reasonable
investigation would reveal. Duff v. Seubert, 110 Idaho 865, 870,
719 P.2d 1125, 1130 (1985)."
JLZ contracted to purchase and then closed on the purchase of
the real property with a pre-existing fuel spill remediation plan
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in existence and in operation with positive progress.

JLZ was on

notice of the extent of the contamination and the manner of
remediation.

JLZ did not bargain for anything different.

Any

harm or damage to JLZ were based solely upon the actions of JLZ.

C.

The Post Closing Conduct Does Not Result In Liability
By ALBAR

If the conduct after closing is relevant to the
interpretation of the PSA (and the respective obligations of the
parties), after closing, i t is readily apparent that JLZ had not
informed itself sufficiently as to environmental concerns and
processes regarding remediation prior to purchasing the first
three parcels to the west, then closing on the Dock-N-Shop
property, and then its later efforts and acquisition of adjoining
properties to the east.
The lack of investigation and planning by Echo VanderWal/JLZ,
an absentee landowner prone to emotional shutdown and/or emotional
outbursts, does not result in the liability for Albar as sought.
The evidence shows that only due to JLZ not continuing the
commercial operations, did the IDEQ seek discussions to move the
goalposts for remediation from commercial to residential
standards.
The evidence shows that JLZ did not understand that
purchasing the two UST resulted in her liability and
responsibility for those USTs.

Although not provided for in any

reasonable interpretation of the intention at the time of
contracting and closing, JLZ asserts that removal of the building
and removal the USTs was Albar's responsibility.
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The PSA terms

are contrary to such an interpretation.

In fact, JLZ had pledged

those improvements to Albar as security for the unpaid purchase
price.

Further, there is no showing that such removal was

required to obtain IDEQ clearance for the ALBAR remediation
pursuant to the ALBAR Consent Order.
Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 does not provide for any
express requirement for a final remediation, let alone a time
frame for remediation.

JLZ's actions in ceasing operations of the

ongoing commercial business and its statement of possible plans
for the property, brought about discussion, although no actual
agreement or modification of the remediation, by IDEQ for
residential standards as opposed to commercial levels.
JLZ was the only one that required or wanted the Dock-n-Shop
building and/or the two USTs removed.

Such a course was not

required for remediation of the site as an ongoing commercial
operation.
JLZ did not present any evidence of any Notice of Violation
being issued by the IDEQ to ALBAR nor any enforcement action by
IDEQ against ALBAR as to the remediation being conducted.

It was

the conduct of JLZ by voluntarily taking on the liability and
responsibility for remediation, which resulted in the Consent
Order between the IDEQ and ALBAR being terminated.
The only witness to testify in the action that had been at
the IDEQ during the Albar remediation plan formulation was Paula
Lyon. JLZ did not bring forth any witness from IDEQ to support the
contentions and positions it urged regarding what was necessary
for IDEQ clearance.
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D.

JLZ's Enrollment In The Voluntary Cleanup Program
Relieved ALBAR of Its Consent Order Obligations

By JLZ's conduct, the Dock-N-Shop real property was enrolled
into the IDEQ Voluntary Cleanup program, and the Consent Order
between ALBAR and the IDEQ was terminated and ALBAR was released
from liability.

JLZ waived or released any obligation of ALBAR,

assumed the risk, prevented performance by ALBAR, and/or was
estopped to assert any breach for damages that in any way relate
to JLZ's Voluntary Clean efforts, which precluded any further
efforts by ALBAR.
In actuality, JLZ urged an interpretation of the contact
contrary to the terms of the face of the contract.

By the post-

closing conduct by JLZ, the actual obligations of Albar under the
contract could not be met. The conduct of JLZ directly impaired
and impeded Albar's contractual obligations to JLZ regarding the
ongoing remediation.

Specifically: JLZ ceased operating the

commercial business and ceased using the two USTs.

JLZ, contrary

to the contract and the CUP application, made proposed residential
uses on the Dock-N-Shop property to IDEQ, which were not the as is
condition of the property.
Echo VanderWal of JLZ at some point in time convinced herself
that no matter what i t wanted done on the property, whether as to
specifics for the remediation or as to a timeline, that Albar had
to do it.

The conduct and actions of JLZ cannot withstand the

scrutiny of reasonableness, required by the law.
Albar made several reasonable proposals to JLZ as the dispute
arose and the issues went forward regarding remediation.
evidence shows that JLZ took only one consistent position:
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The
ALBAR

MOST DO WHAT JLZ WANTS.

JLZ made no proposals for resolution

given the changed circumstances of its uses of the property after
closing and after acquiring additional properties.
It is important to recognize that at the time of the trial in
June 2009, JLZ had not accomplished what it complained of Albar
not accomplishing.

JLZ did not obtain IDEQ closure regarding the

petroleum release until in June 2010, and did not complete it
reimbursement until in 2011.

E.

ALBAR Did Not Breach The Contract With JLZ

JLZ failed to show a breach of contract by ALBAR of the
contractual terms.

Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 does not

require remediation to JLZ's sole desire.
duty of good faith.

ALBAR met its implied

The conduct of JLZ was the cause of any

damage asserted by JLZ.

The District Court erred in finding a

breach of contract by ALBAR in favor of JLZ, and such a finding
and conclusion should be reversed on appeal.

II.

ALBAR, INC. IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR REMEDIATION BY JLZ
ENTERPRISES, INC. AS DAMAGES
In the event the District Court's findings and conclusions of

a breach of contract are upheld, ALBAR is not responsible for
damages as awarded by the District Court.

JLZ asserted several

damages for breach of contract and was awarded damages for
expenditures made by JLZ in pursuing its own remediation to its
own standards.
In Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho
879, 884-85 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated regarding
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damages, as follows:
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that
arise naturally from the breach and are reasonably
foreseeable. Appe~ v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141
(2000). Damages need not have been precisely and
specifically foreseeable, but only such as were reasonably
foreseeable by the parties at the time they contracted. Id.;
Suitts v. First Sec. Bank or Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 22,
713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985). Consequential damages are not
recoverable unless specifically within the contemplation of
the parties at time of contracting. Appe~ v. LePage, 135
Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000); Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v.
Chicago Tit~e Co. or Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423,
428 (1988).
JLZ undertook major work on the premises by removing the preexisting building and portions of the ALBAR remediation system in
place.
USTs.

JLZ ceased use of the existing USTs and later removing the
JLZ also enrolled the property into the IDEQ voluntary

remediation and pilot project funding programs, undertook its own
planned remediation, and voluntarily accepted liability for
remediation.
JLZ was on notice at the time of entering into the Purchase
And Sale Agreement and at the time of closing the purchase, of the
ongoing IDEQ approved and PSTF financed remediation.

JLZ was on

notice of all reasonable information that a reasonable
investigation at the time of purchase would have revealed.

JLZ

was kept reasonable informed and involved in the remediation by
ALBAR and/or its contractors and insurer.
JLZ seeks damages for i t having to undertake remediation to
get the property "cleared for development" which was not the
contracted for bargain.
ongoing remediation.

JLZ bought a going concern, with an

JLZ cannot recover for asserted damages that

are beyond the contemplation of the parties to the contract.
In addition, JLZ had a duty to mitigate damages (also known
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as the doctrine of avoidable consequences) which will deny
recovery for damages which could have been avoided or recovered by
reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures.
The testimony of Echo VanderWal and her assertions and
responses, lend little as to credibility for the positions she
takes.

Echo VanderWal showed by her testimony and the evidence

admitted shows, that she has a propensity to react emotionally and
with little rational, when faced with almost any matter regarding
this property and environmental clean up.

The evidence shows that

she attempts to transfer all of her errors in decision and
judgment as to the environmental status of the property, to ALBAR.
Echo VanderWal does not appear to take or accept any responsible
for the situations she placed herself in.
The bottom line is that JLZ is claiming contractual
obligations and duties that are not a part of the contract and
closing documents and that are not a reasonable interpretation of
paragraph 3 of the counter offer contained in the PSA.

JLZ cannot

recover damages beyond the contemplated scope of the parties.

III. ALBAR WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS BEFORE THE
DISTRICT COURT
ALBAR, INC. and ELMER B. SUDAU sought an award of costs and
attorney fees before the District Court in sums claimed pursuant
to IRCP 54(d) and 54(e).

ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation, and

ELMER B. SUDAU are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the Note
and the Deed of Trust, the Real Estate Purchase And Sale
Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code § 6-402,
and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The consolidated actions involved the defense of ALBAR,
INC., an Idaho corporation, and ELMER B. SUDAU (CV-2007-1489), on
numerous causes of action of fraud, breach of contract, mutual
mistake, negligence, and involved the prosecution of a
foreclosure action for ALBAR, INC.

(CV-2007-1841), all involving

JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., and ECHO VANDERWAL.
On the foreclosure claims (CV-2007-1489) the Defendant JLZ
ENTERPRISES denied default and liability in its Answer (dated
December 4, 2007); then denied direct Requests For Admission (see
Notice of Filing filed September 9, 2008) as to default and
liability; then opposed summary judgment (including partial) by
affidavit and argument, and then on the eve of trial entered into
the Stipulation To Admit as to default and liability.

JLZ

ENTERPRISES then during and after trial disputed interest as
related to the foreclosure.
On the claims of JLZ ENTERPRISES, all claims against SUDAU
were dismissed with prejudice, as well as most claims against
ALBAR, INC.

In addition, the claim of rescission was withdrawn

during trial and denied as a remedy.

Although JLZ ENTERPRISES

did prevail on a claim of breach of contract, said damages were
based on a finding of ambiguity in the contract and a District
Court imposed reasonable period for remediation.

In addition,

JLZ ENTERPRISES claimed damages in excess of $2,300,000 million
before trial and as an offset in excess of $450,000 at trial.
The actual amount awarded as an offset was significantly less,
with a net foreclosure judgment in favor of ALBAR, INC.
Taking into consideration the totality of the conduct of JLZ
ENTERPRISES, the resolution of the various claims, the damage
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claims by JLZ, and the resulting net judgment in favor of ALBAR,
INC., results in an award to ALBAR, INC. and to AL SUDAU as the
prevailing party (ies) is (are) as being appropriate and
reasonable.

IV.

ALBAR IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE OFFSET DAMAGES AWARDED
FOR THE SUMS RECEIVED BY JLZ FROM IDEQ FOR REMEDIATION
ALBAR sought relief from the offset damages awarded to JLZ

following trial, based upon the reimbursement received by JLZ from
the IDEQ.

At the time of trial, JLZ and the Dock-N-Shop property

were enrolled in a Voluntary Remediation program with Pilot
Project reimbursement funds available for clean up costs.
Following the trial, the District Court awarded JLZ offset damages
against the sums due ALBAR for cleanup costs at the Dock-n-Shop
property incurred by JLZ.

A.

The Offset Damages Awarded JLZ Against ALBAR

Following trial and post trial proceedings, the Court entered
a Judgment And Decree Of Sale on July 27, 2010, which awarded JLZ
ENTERPRISES, INC. damages in the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY FOUR AND 72/100 DOLLARS ($228,044.72) as an
offset to the amounts owned ALBAR, INC.

Those damages were in

part described in the Court's announcement of decision on
September 3, 2009 (Transcript Court Trial & Judge's Decision pages
1091 through 1099).

In addition, the damages were itemized in the

Court's Order re: Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration, entered
May 11, 2010.

The offset damages awarded were calculated as

follows:
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Klatt Invoices (PI. Ex. 21)
Glahe & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 22)
Rough Electric Invoices (PI. Ex. 24)
Northwest Fence Invoices (PI. Ex. 28)
Miscellaneous Invoices (PI. Ex. 29 & 30)
Golder & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 31)
Golder & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 45)
Kootenai Excavators Invoice (PI. Ex. 44)
Waste Management Invoices (PI. Ex. 32)
Avista Invoices (PI. Ex. 25)

$ 6,916.00
$ 9,965.00
$ 1,271.00
$ 4,102.00
$ 5,676.00
$ 67,570.00
$ 5,552.00
$ 45,300.00
$ 79,493.65
$ 2,199.07

Total Offset Damages

~228[044.72

At the time of trial JLZ had entered into the State of Idaho,
Department of Environmental Quality program for Voluntary
Remediation, and for reimbursement of the remediation expenses in
the Community Reinvestment Pilot Initiative Reimbursement program.
JLZ had not completed the necessary monitoring to receive final
release of the property and to qualify for reimbursement of
expenses in the pilot program at the time of the trial and posttrial proceedings.

B.

JLZ Obtained Clearance For The Property And Received
Reimbursement From IDEQ

If the damages awarded were appropriate, ALBAR is entitled to
relief for the sums received by JLZ from the IDEQ.

Following the

entry of the Judgment And Decree Of Sale on July 27, 2010, ALBAR
became aware that JLZ had completed the necessary monitoring to
obtain DEQ clearance of the site in June, 2010 (Supplemental
Exhibits "A" & "B") and that JLZ had applied for reimbursement
through the pilot program of its clean up costs, coincidentally,
on July 27, 2010 (Supplemental Exhibit "C").
On or about March 1, 2011, JLZ submitted is revised
application for reimbursement through the IDEQ pilot program of
its clean up costs in the sum of $326,634.79.
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(Supplemental

Exhibit "E") .
On or about March 21, 2011, the IDEQ approved clean up costs
in the sum of $217,950.31 as reimbursable remediation costs as set
forth in a table created by the IDEQ (Supplemental Exhibit "G") as
follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

City of Priest River Expenses
Excavation Expenses
Northwest Fence Co.
Waste Management
Golder & Associates
Prism Environmental (VanMiddlesworth)

$
216.98
$ 60,051. 82
$ 1,230.66
$ 83,732.54
$ 66,243.21
$ 6,475.10

Total DEQ Approved

$217,950.31

The total qualifying remediation costs were $217,950.31, with the
program being capped at $150,000.00 for reimbursement.

The IDEQ

deducted from the available $150,000.00, the sum of $4,978.00 that
the IDEQ had directly disbursed to obtain the last monitoring and
reports necessary for the site clearance.
"F" & "G").

(Supplemental Exhibits

The net amount approved and received on March 29,

2011 by JLZ from the IDEQ reimbursement program was $145,021.95.
A comparison of the amounts awarded by the Court for offset
damages and the amounts the IDEQ approved as qualifying for
reimbursement shows that the common amounts are as follows:
a.

Fence Expenses: The Court awarded $4,102.00 and the
IDEQ approved $1,230.66.

The common figure is

$1,230.66.
b.

Excavation Expenses: The Court awarded $45,300.00 and
the IDEQ approved $60,051.82.

The common figure is

$45,300.00.
c.

Waste Management: The Court awarded $79,493.65 and the
IDEQ approved $83,732.54.
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The common figure is

$79,493.65.
d.

Golder & Associations/VanMiddlesworth: The Court
awarded $73,122.00 and the IDEQ approved $72,718.31.
The common figure is $72,718.31.
The Total Common is:

$198,742.62

The reimbursement received by JLZ (based upon the

max~um

allowed by the program) was $145,021.95, which is less than the
common total of the Court's awarded offsets and the IDEQ approved
reimbursement.

It is undisputed that JLZ received the funds from

the IDEQ for remediation reimbursement.
ALBAR is entitled to relief from the judgment by reducing the
offset damages awarded to JLZ for the sums received by JLZ from
the IDEQ reimbursement program based on the duty to
mitigate/doctrine of avoidable consequences, and the general rules
of damages being to compensate in a breach of contract action.
The appropriate relief for ALBAR is to reduce the offset damages
awarded to JLZ by the actual sum it received in reimbursement from
the DEQ of $145,021.95.

C.

ALBAR's Motion For Relief From Judgment Was
Appropriate

T~ely

And

ALBAR's motion for relief from judgment was made pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 60 (b) , which provides (emphasis added) as follows:
(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect, Newly
Discovered Evidence, Fraud, Grounds for Relief From Judgment
on Order. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
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other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require leave
from the Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case
may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled
upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or
(ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year
after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a
party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other
jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action,
or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
Here the motion for relief included new evidence created
after the actual trial proceedings in the case, and following the
actual entry of the judgment in the case (which was upon appeal at
the time).

The actual completion of remediation and the

application for and then receipt of reimbursement by JLZ happened
subsequent to the District Court's decision.
As set forth in Moffett v. Moffett, 253 P.3d 764, 770 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted),

"I.R.C.P. 60(b) authorizes

the presentation of new evidence .. .. ff

ALBAR is entitled, upon

such terms as are just, to relief from the awarded offset damages
to JLZ in the Judgment And Decree Of Sale, due to JLZ receiving
final clean up and reimbursement from the DEQ, which would
qualify under Rule 60(b) (2) as newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); or under Rule 60 (b) (5) or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
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application to the calculations of the amount due for the
foreclosure sale upon the security; or 60(b) (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, as the
application of the duty to mitigate damages and the doctrine of
avoidable consequences apply to the damages recoverable by JLZ as
an offset.
The motion by ALBAR was made within a reasonable time of
learning that JLZ had received clearance from the DEQ and that
JLZ had applied for reimbursement, and such motion was not more
than six (6) months after the judgment was entered.

The trial

was completed in June, 2009, with the decision, reconsideration,
and briefing resulting in the judgment being entered July 27,
2010.

JLZ completed final monitoring (based upon funding by

IDEQ) and received clearance from DEQ in June 2010, and first
applied for reimbursement from DEQ on July 27, 2010.

JLZ

submitted an amended application for reimbursement in March 2011
and on March 29, 2011 the reimbursement funds were disbursed by
the IDEQ to JLZ.

ALBAR's motion was filed November 30, 2010

while the application for reimbursement was still pending.
The facts that subsequent to trial JLZ completed final
monitoring, received clearance from the IDEQ for the property,
applied for reimbursement from the IDEQ pursuant to the pilot
rebate program, and received an actual rebate of $145,021.95 for
much of the same sums ($198,742.62) as were awarded as offset
damages ($228,044.72) against ALBAR for breach of contract, meets
the requisite showings under IRCP 60(b).
Under Rule 60(b) (2) the facts are newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
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move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
Under Rule 60(b) (5) the facts make i t no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application to the same
offset calculations against the amount due to ALBAR for the
foreclosure sale upon the security.
Under Rule 60(b) (6) the facts are any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, as the
application of the duty to mitigate damages and the doctrine of
avoidable consequences apply to the damages recoverable by JLZ as
an offset.

D.

The Duty To Mitigate, Also Known As The Doctrine Of
Avoidable Consequences, Applies To The Reimbursement
JLZ Received

JLZ claimed and was awarded offset damages against ALBAR by
the District Court for breach of contract measured as cleanup
costs at the Dock-n-Shop property.

JLZ at the time of the award

of the offset damages was enrolled in a voluntary cleanup and a
program for reimbursement, but asserted it could not afford to pay
for the limited remaining monitoring to obtain the clearance and
to obtain the reimbursement.
Subsequent to trial and the District's Court decision, JLZ
obtained a Certificate of Completion and a Covenant Not To Sue for
the clean up of the property (Supplement Exhibits "A" & "B").

JLZ

for and been approved for and has actually received $145,021.95 in
reimbursement for clean up expenses (Supplemental Exhibits "C",
"D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" & "J").

The reimbursement received

includes significant sums which are the same as the sums awarded
as offset damages in the action against ALBAR.
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As set forth in Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho
253, 261 (1993), which involved an action for breach of a real
estate contract, the Idaho Supreme Court recited that:
The duty to mitigate, also known as the "doctrine of
avoidable consequences," provides that a plaintiff who is
injured by actionable conduct of a defendant is ordinarily
denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by
reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures, after
actionable conduct has taken place. O'Nei~ v. Vasseur, 118
Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Ct.App.1990); Davis v. First
Interstate Bank ox Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680
(1988) .

As set forth in O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1990), which involved a breach of contract action
against attorneys in the handling of an action, which was
subsequently resolved by the pro se client, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has described and applied the doctrine, as follows:
It is well established that the party entitled to the
benefit of a contract has as a duty to use "reasonable
exertion" to mitigate his damages. Wicker v. Hoppock, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 18 L.Ed. 752 (1878). Such a policy
protects "persons against whom wrongs have been committed
from passively suffering economic loss which could be
averted by reasonable efforts." Industria~ Leasing Corp. v.
Thomason, 96 Idaho 574, 577, 532 P.2d 916, 919 (1974);
quoting Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965).

As explained in 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 28 Compensation as
limit of recovery, "The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in
other words, a plaintiff who is injured by reason of a
defendant's behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be made
whole, not to be enriched. The sole object of compensatory
damages is to make the injured party whole for losses actually
suffered; the plaintiff cannot be made more than whole, make a
profit, or receive more than one recovery for the same harm.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 40

Thus, a plaintiff in a civil action for damages cannot, in the
absence of punitive or statutory treble damages, recover more
than the loss actually suffered. The plaintiff is not entitled to
a windfall, and the law will not put him in a better position
than he would be in had the wrong not been done or the contract
not been broken."
At the time of trial in this matter, ALBAR asserted the duty
to mitigate, also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences,
against JLZ for its own conduct of failing to complete the
voluntary clean up plan and pilot

re~ursement

program in which

i t and the Dock-n-Shop property were enrolled with DEQ.
completed and

re~ursement

If

received, that would reduce the

damages to JLZ for its claimed breach of contract by ALBAR.
JLZ subsequently completed the clean up and was

re~ursed.

JLZ is not entitled to a duplicative recovery by offset damages
against ALBAR and by reimbursement by the IDEQ for the same sums
expended.

JLZ is only entitled to be made whole by an award for

breach of contract, not to be enriched or to receive a windfall,
by the award.
The sole object of compensatory damages is to make JLZ whole
for losses actually suffered.

JLZ cannot be made more than

whole, make a profit, or receive more than one recovery for the
same harm (the expenditures for cleanup).

JLZ cannot recover

more than the loss actually suffered and the law will not put JLZ
in a better position than had there been no damages for breach of
contract.

The loss suffered is reduced by the reimbursement

received by the IDEQ.
If JLZ is allowed to receive offset damages and to actually
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 41

keep the reimbursement funds from the IDEQ, an abhorred
duplicative recovery would result.

To prevent such a situation,

the offset damages awarded to JLZ against the sums due to ALBAR
must be reduced.

E.

The Collateral Source Rule Is Inapplicable In Regards
To Breach Of Contract Damages

JLZ asserted that the Collateral Source Rule prevents ALBAR
from having the offset damages reduced by the reimbursement
received from the IDEQ as a collateral source.

At common law,

the collateral source rule or doctrine is as described in
Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 924, 821 P.2d 973,
979 (1991), as follows:
As this Court stated in Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho
346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988):
Generally, the collateral source doctrine is as
follows:
Where a plaintiff is compensated for his injuries by
some source independent of the tortfeasor-insurance,
for example-the general rule is that the plaintiff is
still permitted to make a full recovery against the
tortfeasor himself, even though this gives the
plaintiff a double recovery or even a recovery for
losses he never had at all.
Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 352, 766 P.2d at 1233, quoting
wi th approval from D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 8.10,
pp. 581-82 (1973).
As set forth in Daryl Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., Sudenga
Indus., Inc., an Iowa cOrporation, 22213, 1997 WL 327356 (Idaho
Ct. App. June 17, 1997) aff'd sub nom. Tuttle v. Wayment Farms,
Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 952 P.2d 1241 (1998), "A collateral source
is defined as compensation from a source wholly independent of

the tortfeasor, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 262 (6th ed.1990) , for
example, sickness or health insurance or worker's compensation
insurance payments."
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In 1990, the legislature adopted Idaho Code § 6-1606.
Prohibiting double recoveries from collateral sources, which
provides as follows:
In any action for personal injury or property damage, a
judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages
which exceed amounts received by the claimant from
collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury
or property damage, whether from private, group or
governmental sources, and whether contributory or
noncontributory. For the purposes of this section,
collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under
federal programs which by law must seek subrogation, death
benefits paid under life insurance contracts, benefits paid
by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title
41, Idaho Code, and benefits paid which are recoverable
under subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by
contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is
admissible to the court after the finder of fact has
rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court
to the extent the award includes compensation for damages
which have been compensated independently from collateral
sources. S.L. 1990, ch. 131, § 1.
The collateral source rule at common law does not apply to
this breach of contract action.

The statutory provisions of Idaho

Code § 6-1606 adopted in 1990 do not apply to this breach of
contract action.

In Idaho, by common law and statutory provision,

the collateral source rule applies only to tort claims and
recovery from tortfeasors for personal injury or property damage.
22 Am Jur. 2d. Damages § 392 Generally provides that the
collateral source rule applies in the circumstances of tort
recoveries, because the basis of a recovery in a tort case is not
just for compensation.

In a breach of contract action the sole

basis of recovery is compensation.

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 394.

Applicability in breach-of-contract cases provides that "[t]he
case for the application of the collateral-source rule is less
compelling in breach-of-contract cases than in the case of a
tort. The reason is that no one should profit more from the
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breach of an obligation than he or she would if the cont::riCllL·c::::::t were
fully performed. Thus, the rule is held inapplicable to

~~~ach-

of-contract recoveries."
In this action JLZ was awarded compensatory damages

£,o:r

breach of contract against ALBAR as an offset to the amo''!U:r.::L t
ALBAR.

This is strictly a breach of contact award, and a..a

due
such

the collateral source rule is inapplicable.

F.

Is Entitled To Relief From The Judgment S~
Reducing The Offset Damages By The Sum Of Reimb"'l.1..::rsement
Received By JLZ

~bar

ALBAR is entitled to relief from the amount of

offse~

awarded to JLZ in the Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered
2010.

clamages
27,

,~~ly

The completion and reimbursement to JLZ is newly

discovered evidence created after trial and the entry of
judgment.

that

The reimbursement makes i t no longer equitablE:

the amount of net judgment in favor of ALBAR, INC. for
foreclosure should be reduced to extent prior to

reimbur,s~ent.

The reimbursement also justifies relief from the

operati~Z1

of the

original calculation of offset damages in the judgment.
only entitled to a single recovery for compensatory
breach of contract.

damag~~

JLZ received the sum of $145,021.95

£or

1:~c>n

the

IDEQ pilot program to reimburse it for clean up expendi tu X".E!!:oS .
Those same expenditures were the basis for the award of DX"E!!a.ch of
contract damages.

The net sum of damages after reimburse:DIL,E!!:lrl. t

the only property calculation pursuant to the Court's

fi~'~~lrl.9S

is
and

conclusions.
~ternatively,

if the offset damages awarded against

,~BAR

are not reduced by the reimbursement received, ALBAR wouLd
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:be

subrogated to the funds reimbursed and/or would be entitled to
equitable reimbursement from the funds received by JLZ from the
IDEQ.

The Court should reduce the offset damages awarded in this

action for the sake of judicial economy, rather that have ALBAR
commence a separate action for subrogation and equitable
reimbursement.
As set forth above, ALBAR is entitled to the relief sought,
specifically a reduction of the offset damages by the sum received
by JLZ from the IDEQ.

V.

ALBAR IS ENTITELD TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
ALBAR seeks an award of costs and attorney fees upon appeal

pursuant to IAR 40 & 41 District Court.

ALBAR is entitled to

attorney fees pursuant to the Note and the Deed of Trust, the
Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and
12-121, and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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CONCLUSION
Albar is entitled to the relief requested above with the
District Court's findings and conclusions of a breach of contract
being reversed.

If a breach is found, the damages awarded by the

District Court should be reversed.

If the damages are upheld,

Albar should receive relief from the damages awarded, for the sums
received for reimbursement to JLZ from the IDEQ for remediation.
Lastly, Albar should be awarded its attorney fees and costs,
before the District Court and upon appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of April, 2012.

INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant ALBAR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this {~daY of April, 2012, two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to:
Charles R. Dean Jr.
Dean & Kolts
320 E. Neider Ave., Suite 103
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
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